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We explore how the short-run effects of
Covid-19 in reducing CO2 and local airJoulepollutant emissions can easily be out-
weighed by the long-run effects of a
slowing of clean energy innovation.
Focusing on the United States, we
show that in the short run, Covid-19
has reduced consumption of jet fuel
and gasoline dramatically, by 50% and
30% respectively, while electricity de-
mand has declined by less than 10%.
CO2 emissions have declined by 15%,
while local air pollutants have also
declined, saving about 200 lives per
month. However, there could be a
deep impact on long-run innovation in
clean energy, leading to an additional
2,500 million metric tons (MMT) CO2
cumulatively and 40 deaths per month
on average from now to 2035. Even
pushing back renewable electricity
generation investments by one year
would outweigh the emission reduc-
tions and avoided deaths from March
to June of 2020. The policy response
will determine how Covid-19 ultimately
influences the future path of emissions.The Covid-19 pandemic has upended
the world. Any time there is a major
change in economic activity, there will
be implications for the environment. We
take a macro-level perspective on the
environmental effects of Covid-19 in
both the short run and long run. In the
short run, there has been an emptying
of our roads, skies, factories, and com-
mercial office buildings, reducing emis-
sions and clearing the air, but at a dra-
matic cost to overall well-being and the
economy. In the long run, the implica-
tions of Covid-19 are deeply uncertain.
We present two illustrative thought ex-
periments to provide insight into the
long-run environmental effects of the
pandemic, drawing upon evidence from
previous economic shocks. These in-
sights on long-run effects provide guid-
ance for policy to mitigate potential
long-run negative implications.In the short run, the reduced emissions
from Covid-19 are substantial, but the4, 1–5, July 15, 2020 ª 2020 Elsevier Inc. 1
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Commentaryhealth benefits from the cleaner air do
not come close to outweighing the
direct loss of life from the pandemic in
the United States. If the threat from
the pandemic subsides relatively
quickly and the economy rebounds,
there should be few long-run implica-
tions. However, if the struggle against
Covid-19 leads to a persistent global
recession, there is a real long-run threat
to the adoption of clean technology,
which could even outweigh any short-
run ‘‘silver lining’’ environmental bene-
fits due to both Covid-19 and the reces-
sion. Whether this occurs will depend
on the policy response.
Our focus is on the United States, but
our main findings could apply more
broadly across much of the devel-
oped world, including many Euro-
pean countries. Fundamentally, it is
the global response to the pandemic
that will determine the long-run
effects.
Short-run Effects
Covid-19 has directly led all of the
world’s largest economies to come to
a near-standstill, with widespread shut-
downs and restrictions remaining even
when shutdowns have been relaxed.
Conferences, gatherings, and travel of
all types have been deeply curtailed.
Large swaths of the economy have
been affected. One silver lining in this
devastating circumstance is that it has
led to reductions in emissions,
including greenhouse gas emissions
and local air pollutant emissions, due
to the decline in the demand for
energy.
We explore these reductions by
comparing energy consumption in late
March to June 7, 2020, after the
pandemic began, to consumption
before the shutdowns. We predict en-
ergy consumption during the shut-
downs by controlling for the impacts
of weather, renewable generation, and
seasonal patterns (see Supplemental
Information for details).2 Joule 4, 1–5, July 15, 2020Figure 1 displays the results. (A) shows
that the largest percentage declines in
energy consumption are from jet fuel
and gasoline, with reductions of 50%
and 30% that appear persistent (see
C for overall oil consumption over
time), in line with estimates of per-
sonal vehicle travel.1 In contrast,
most other categories have observed
smaller reductions. Use of natural gas
in residential and commercial build-
ings has declined by almost 20%,
while overall electricity demand (and
demand for coal-fired electricity) has
declined by less than 10%. While com-
mercial and industrial electricity use
may have been affected by the shut-
downs, some of the decline was offset
by increased residential electricity
demand from people staying at
home, and by June, electricity con-
sumption has largely returned to the
trend (D).2
(B) illustrates the declines in CO2 emis-
sions corresponding to the reductions
in energy use. The largest reductions
are in gasoline, but the natural gas
decline leads to nearly as large a
reduction in CO2 emissions as for jet
fuel. These reductions imply a roughly
15% total reduction in daily CO2 emis-
sions, which will be the largest annual
percentage decline for the United
States in recorded history should this
drop continue. For context, the
decline in CO2 emissions is in line
with the declines laid out in the
2025 U.S. Nationally Determined Con-
tributions under the Paris Agreement,
but the sources of the decrease are
entirely different than would be ex-
pected under an optimal emissions
reduction strategy focusing on both
behavioral and structural changes to
the energy system. Other estimates
tend to focus on the world rather
than the United States or do not cover
all fuels. While estimates for the
United States cover a very wide range,
our finding is similar to the 17% global
decline in CO2 emissions for the
period through April 2020.3The reductions in energy demand are
also reducing emissions of local air pol-
lutants that affect near-term human
health. We calculate the reductions in
SO2, nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile
organic compounds (VOCs), and partic-
ular matter (PM) emissions (see Supple-
mental Information for details). The re-
ductions range from 12% for NOx to
1% for PM. We estimate that the shut-
downs save about 200 lives per month,
primarily driven by the lower PM emis-
sions from transportation. Of course,
these are small consolations for the
over 100,000 confirmed deaths due to
Covid-19 before June 2020.
Along with the reduction in driving from
the shutdowns has also come a decline
in traffic accidents and congestion. For
example, the number of crashes over
the period of March 13, 2020 to early
April are less than half of the previous
year, although fatal crashes did not
decline by as much, perhaps due to
the remaining vehicles being driven
longer (see Supplemental Information).
There is also a more subtle impact due
to the shutdowns: most investment in
the low-carbon transition has come to
a halt. Global electric vehicle sales are
projected to decline by 43% in 20204
due to the plummeting auto sales over-
all combined with low gasoline prices.
New residential rooftop solar and stor-
age installations have plummeted, as
have energy efficiency audits. Even at
the utility scale, renewable develop-
ments have been slowed. Overall clean
energy jobs dropped by almost
600,000 by the end of April.5 While
these are short-run impacts, they may
have long-run effects.
Long-run Effects
While the short-run effects of Covid-19
are already clear, the long-run effects
are highly uncertain. How the pandemic
influences emissions and health out-
comes in the long run depends
on how long it takes to bring the
pandemic under control and whether
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Figure 1. Declines in Energy Consumption and Emissions Due to Covid-19
Short-run reductions in energy use (terajoule [TJ]/day) and emissions (metric tons CO2/day) due to Covid-19 in the United States. Note: 99% confidence
intervals shown in (A) and (B).
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Commentarythe pandemic leads to a persistent eco-
nomic contraction. To develop insight
in the presence of such deep uncer-
tainty, we consider two illustrative
‘‘thought experiments’’ that roughly
bound what might happen, while
emphasizing that the true outcome
may fall in between these scenarios or,
while unlikely, could be even more
extreme than either.
The first thought experiment considers
a best-case scenario where the world
develops treatments and effective low-
cost strategies to control Covid-19 so
that the economy can be progressively
reopened within a matter of severalmonths and entirely reopened by the
end of 2020.While therewould be thou-
sands of deaths, theworst projections of
millions of lives lost were averted in this
scenario. Thus, Covid-19 would be a
relatively short-lived shock to the world
economy. Most demand for products
and services will be deferred rather
than destroyed, so when the entire
economy is safely reopened, there will
be a massive rebound in economic ac-
tivity, likely even surpassing the activity
prior to the outbreak.
Thus, the implications of Covid-19 will
only be temporary reductions in emis-
sions. The trends prior to the pandemicwill continue after a brief lapse,
including investments in green technol-
ogies. For example, wind and solar ca-
pacity were increasing rapidly prior to
Covid-19—an increase of 10.5% in
2019,6 and in this scenario, new installa-
tions will pick up where they left off.
Energy efficiency investments will
continue as if the pandemic had never
happened. Overall energy-using habits
will return to the preexisting trend after
a rebound, leaving policymakers largely
where they were prior to Covid-19,
albeit with more budgetary challenges.
We view our second thought experi-
ment as more likely. In this scenario,Joule 4, 1–5, July 15, 2020 3
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Figure 2. Illustrative Scenario of the Long-run Effects of Covid-19
Trajectory of CO2 emissions (MtCO2 per year) from (A) electricity generation and (B) light-duty
vehicles in the United States because of short-run reductions of energy use and delayed
investments in clean energy technologies and vehicle fuel economy.
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reaching, with many more deaths,
deeper disruptions to supply chains,
and a persistent global recession. This
could come about if there are
continued flare-ups requiring backped-
aling on re-opening of the economy
and would be exacerbated if devel-
oping a successful vaccine in a timely
manner proves impossible. In this sce-
nario, substantial demand for goods
and services will be destroyed, rather
than deferred, and real production will
be reduced.
In this case, there will be a direct effect
and an indirect effect. The direct effect
is the short-run emissions reduction
due to Covid-19 and the associated
recession. We can examine the effects
of the Great Recession beginning in
2008 for some guidance on the effects
of recession. Between 2008 and 2013,
U.S. energy-related CO2 emissions fell
by nearly 10%.74 Joule 4, 1–5, July 15, 2020The indirect effect is due to changes in
behavior and investment. Should shut-
downs continue for an extended period
of time, workers and employers may
become sufficiently comfortable with
remote working that even after the
threat has passed, this option continues
to be popular. This would reduce travel
but likely increase building energy use.
Home energy use would increase, while
commercial building use would remain
largely unchanged if office space is
used in a similar manner by the remain-
ing employees, implying a modest net
effect. However, one cannot rule out
more substantial changes in commer-
cial building use if telecommuting be-
comes widespread. Another behavioral
response might be if individuals remain
fearful of taking public transportation
even after the pandemic is under con-
trol and switch to driving instead. But
this will likely be a modest effect in the
United States, as only about 5% of com-
muters take public transport.8The more important long-run indirect
effect of Covid-19 in this case is likely
to be on energy sector investment.
The most marginal firms, including
new firms that have yet to show a profit,
are those most likely to liquidate. This
could include coal mining firms due to
the decreased demand for electricity
and the declining profitability of coal-
fired generation, but it also includes
firms developing low-carbon technolo-
gies. In a recession, with financing dry-
ing up and low wholesale electricity pri-
ces due to reduced electricity demand,
renewables investments will decline.
This will affect rooftop solar, utility-
scale solar, and energy efficiency in-
vestments.9 The transition to a cleaner
vehicle fleet would also be affected.
The short-run decline in electric vehicle
sales would persist, but perhaps more
importantly, cash-strapped automakers
will be hard-pressed to continue invest-
ing asmuch in new vehicle technologies
to improve efficiency, and there will
be a diminished rollout of charging
infrastructure.
To explore the implications of a more
severe scenario, we perform an illustra-
tive modeling exercise on how long-run
emissions would be affected (see Sup-
plemental Information). Figure 2 dis-
plays the average trajectory of CO2
emissions from electricity generation
and light-duty vehicles. For compari-
son, we also show what the short-run
reduction would look like if it extended
over either one or two quarters. We find
that under plausible assumptions on
how the pandemic could delay invest-
ments in clean energy technologies
and vehicle fuel economy, the long-
run impact on CO2 and local air
pollutant emissions could easily
outweigh the short-run reductions. Af-
ter netting out the short-run reduction
in economic activity due to the
pandemic, we calculate that delays in
investments in renewables and vehicle
fuel economy alone could lead to an
additional 2,500 MMT of CO2 cumula-
tively from 2020 to 2035. The additional
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Commentarylocal air pollutants could lead to 40
deaths per month on average, or
7,500 deaths, from 2020 to 2035. In
our simulations, we assume no perma-
nent changes to consumption from the
pandemic. But we calculate that if there
are such changes, they would need to
be large—at least 4% of total energy-
related emissions—to compensate
for the delayed investment. Similarly,
coal retirements would have to more
than double from pre-pandemic
forecasts to offset the delayed renew-
ables investment (see Supplemental
Information).
Our findings suggest that even just
pushing back all renewable electricity
generation investments by one year
would outweigh the emissions reduc-
tions and avoided deaths from March
to June of 2020. However, the energy
policy response to Covid-19 is the wild
card that can change everything.
Implications for Policy
Even if the world does face our second
thought experiment, long-run emission
increases are not preordained. The
government policy response is
crucial.10 And there is a real reason to
be concerned. Government budgets
are going to be stretched thin in paying
for the costs of Covid-19, making it
more difficult to invest in clean energy
and public transportation. Further-
more, if the economy remains in a
persistent recession, there may be
intense pressure to relax climate
change mitigation targets. But there is
also an opportunity.
Many nations around the world,
including those in the EU, UK, Japan,
and South Korea, are considering stim-
ulus packages explicitly focusing on
clean energy. But in the United States,
it is unlikely that clean technology and
infrastructure will be at the heart of
any stimulus package in the near future
even if that possibility cannot be ruledout. The American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act stimulus package in
2009 allocated sums toward clean en-
ergy investment, and similar invest-
ments are in the policy debate.11 Even
a modest allocation toward new tech-
nologies may pay dividends in the
future in terms of clean air, clean jobs,
and national security.12 But simply sta-
bilizing the economy would be valuable
for putting the trends toward clean en-
ergy back on track.
At the state level, there may be more
room for policy action. If financing
dries up for new investment in renew-
ables, state green banks can help
bridge the gap. States can also expe-
dite permitting, while of course retain-
ing environmental and other safe-
guards. Covid-19 may also remind
voters and policymakers that collective
action and listening to scientists mat-
ters, leading to greater efforts on pol-
icy to reduce emissions, possibly even
including carbon pricing. The research
community could start new endeavors
analyzing potential policy options to
help bring us out of the malaise of
Covid-19. These developments would
be a true ‘‘silver lining’’ to the Covid-
19 crisis.
Data and Code Availability
The data and code reported in this pa-
per have been deposited in Github,
https://github.com/MartenOvaere/
energy_longruneffects_covid19_Joule.
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1 Decreased energy consumption 
 
1.1 Data 
 
Table 1 presents the time period, frequency and source of the U.S. energy consumption data used 
in this study. A long time series of weekly oil data is available, while data of weekly natural gas 
consumption and hourly electricity consumption and generation is only available from 2017 and 2019. 
 
Table 1: Source, time period and frequency of data on U.S. energy consumption. 
Energy source Time period Frequency Units Source 
Petroleum and other 
liquids 
2001-2020 Weekly 1000 B/D (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2020d) 
Natural gas 2017-2020 Weekly Bcf/D (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2020c) 
Electricity demand 2019-2020 Hourly MW (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2020b) 
Electricity generation 2019-2020 Hourly MW (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2020b) 
 
 
We also use U.S. heating and cooling degree day data from U.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (2020), to control for the effect of temperature on gas and coal 
consumption from heating and electricity demand. Electricity demand and generation are 
aggregated to daily data, while heating and cooling degree day data are aggregated to weekly 
data when used in the weekly oil and natural gas data. 
 
1.2 Empirical specifications 
 
We estimate the coefficient βCOVID on a COVID dummy that is equal to one on all days or weeks 
of data after March 25, 2020. This is the week starting on March 26 for natural gas and the week 
starting on March 28 for oil. We use ten weeks of post-shutdown data, until June 7, 2020. 
 
Following Hausman and Rapson (2018), we run both a global polynomial regression and a 
two-step augmented local regression to estimate the effect of the COVID-19 measures on energy 
consumption. In the global polynomial regression, we estimate βCOVID in the full data sample (see 
second column of Table 1), while controlling for weather and seasonality. In the augmented local 
regression, on the other hand, we first estimate the impacts of weather, seasonality and other 
controls in the sample ending three weeks before the start of shutdowns, using the following 
empirical specifications for oil (1), natural gas (2), electricity generation (3) and electricity demand 
(4): 
qfuel,t = δt + εt for fuel = {gasoline, kerosene} (1) 
= hddt + cddt + εt for fuel = {res.+com., industrial, total} (2) 
= hddt + cddt + qsolar,t + qwind,t + εt for fuel = {coal, gas, nuclear, hydro} (3) 
= hddt + cddt + εt for fuel = {electricity demand} (4) 
where qfuel,it is the fuel consumption at week or day t, while δt are week fixed-effects to control for 
regular patterns in oil consumption. Because the time period for natural gas and electricity is much 
shorter, we do not use fixed effects, but hddt and cddt are the number of heating and cooling degree 
days in day or week t, to control for the effect of temperatures on natural gas and electricity demand. 
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We also include daily solar and wind electricity generation, which are determined by exogenous 
changes in wind speed and solar irradiance. 
 
In a second step, βCOVID is estimated as the difference of first-stage residuals in a narrow bandwidth 
around the discontinuity (March 26th, 2020). We again ignore three weeks of data before the 
discontinuity to mitigate concerns of behavioral change before official shutdown measures started. 
The global polynomial and augmented local regression lead to very similar results (see 
supplemental estimation file), so we present the results of the augmented local regression. 
 
1.3 Results 
 
Panel a of Figure 1 in the main text presents the results of the above estimation for every major 
energy source. Jet fuel consumption has decreased most in relative terms, while motor gasoline 
consumption has decreased most in absolute terms. Multiplying these estimates by carbon emission 
factors (see Table 2), panel b of this figure presents the decline of daily carbon emissions in million 
tons. Total carbon emissions decreased by around 20% for our studied energy sources, in line with 
the 25% decrease (200 MtCO2) of China’s carbon emissions in the first four weeks after shutdowns 
(CarbonBrief, 2020a). 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 below present similar figures but show the absolute numbers in their original 
units: MMB/D, Bcf/D and TWh/D. 
 
Table 2 compares our estimates of decreased energy consumption and associated carbon 
emissions with three types of recent reports. First, two recent studies look at the changes in energy 
consumption and emissions during shutdowns. Our short-term estimates of total carbon emissions 
(first row) are the most similar to Cicala et al., (2020) and Le Quéré et al., (2020). However, we 
estimate changes in primary energy consumption of oil and gas, and gas- and coal-fired electricity 
generation based on detailed U.S. data, while Le Quéré et al. (2020) estimate worldwide demand 
reductions using consumption proxies by sector and multiplying them by the average carbon 
emission intensity per sector. Cicala et al. (2020) do not estimate the effect on consumption of 
natural gas and coal, but their estimate of oil and electricity are very similar – although though we 
consider a much longer lockdown period.  
 
Other estimates are more different. IEA (2020e) and Liu et al. (2020) present estimates of average 
emission reductions over the first quarter of 2020, so their results are for a different time period 
and thus are difficult to compare to ours. 
 
Our overall 2020 illustrative predictions (sixth row) are somewhat different than other studies. 
However, in our long-run analysis, we focus on light-duty vehicles and electricity, and assume a 
larger negative effect on renewable investment in our worst-case long-run scenario than in other 
reports. In addition, our short-term estimates and 2020 forecasts are relative to business-as-usual 
2020 projections, while EIA (2020e) compares to 2019 values, which may not be an appropriate 
baseline. See section 5 of the SM for more information.  
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Figure 1: Percent and absolute decline in consumption by primary energy source (error 
bars show 99% confidence intervals). 
 
Figure 2: Absolute decline of carbon emissions by primary energy source (error bars 
show 99% confidence intervals) 
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Table 2 Forecasted decrease of carbon emissions and consumption of different energy 
sources 
Carbo
n  
MtCO
2/ day 
Oil Gas Coal  Electr
icity 
Scope Source 
-15% -2.11 -31% -11% -3%1 -7% U.S. This study: 10 weeks of 
shutdown, March-June 
-19% -1.53 -40% / / -6% U.S. Cicala et al. (2020):  
March to mid-April 
-17% -17 / / / / Global Le Quéré et al. (2020): 
March-April 
-5% / -5% -2% -8% / Global IEA (2020e): Q1 
-5.8%       Liu et al. (2020): Q1 
-11.2% -.83 -
26%2 
-1%3 -1%1 -
2.5% 
U.S. This study: 2020 
-7.5% / -
9.3% 
-
5.8% 
-20% -
4.5% 
U.S. EIA (2020e): 2020 
-8%  -7.1 -9% < -
2% 
-8% -5% Global IEA (2020e): 2020 
-5.5%  -5.5 -
9.4% 
/ / / Global CarbonBrief (2020b): 
2020 
1 From coal-fired electricity generation only. 
2 From light-duty vehicles only. 
3 From gas-fired electricity generation only. 
 
Figure 3 presents 2019-2020 time series of actual energy consumption and electricity 
generation, and compares it with the 99% confidence interval of predicted consumption, based 
on equations (1)-(4). The red vertical line indicates March 26th, which is the start date of 
shutdowns assumed in our study. 
 
After a significant drop in gasoline and kerosene consumption around the start of the first 
shutdowns, gasoline consumption slowly started to increase, while kerosene consumption stayed 
almost flat. Consumption of other oils (propane, propylene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil) has 
also decreased, but by much less. We also find that electricity consumption already started 
dropping by mid-April, which mainly led to lower gas-fired electricity generation and coal to a 
lesser extent. By the end of May, electricity consumption was again close to predicted levels. 
Industrial, residential, and commercial natural gas consumption have also decreased significantly 
and continue to be somewhat below predicted values.   
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Figure 3: Comparing actual energy consumption and electricity generation with the 99% 
confidence interval of expected consumption in our model. 
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2 Decreased CO2, NOx, SO2, PM10 and VOC emissions and emission-
related deaths 
 
In a second step, we translate the estimated decreases of energy consumption into lower emissions 
of local pollutants (SOx, NOx, PM10 and VOC). To calculate the avoided emissions of all 
considered energy sources, we use the emission factors from Table 2. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (2020b) compiles emission factors of all energy sources, but where available, 
we increase precision by calculating emission factors as the ratio of published total emissions and 
total consumption in 2018 or 2019, because emissions largely depend on the operating set point, 
air/fuel mixing, maintenance problems, and the control technology used. For example, local 
pollutant emission factors of gasoline and kerosene are calculated as the ratio of 2018 total 
transportation emissions (5953 kton for NOx, 96 kton for SO2, 431 kton for PM10, and 3230 kton 
for VOC.) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) and the 5.2 billion barrels of 
transportation consumption in 2018 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020d). Coal- and 
gas-fired electricity generation CO2, SOx and NOx emissions are the ratio of their 2018 total 
emissions (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020e) and total 2018 generation (968 and 
1581 TWh respectively). This approach implicitly assumes that all coal- and gas-fired plants 
respond to lower electricity demand. If, however, less-clean plants respond more, these emission 
factors are an underestimation of avoided emissions. Similarly, if cleaner transportation responds 
more, the emission factors for gasoline are an overestimation. 
 
PM10 and VOC emission factors of gas-fired electricity generation are assumed to equal those 
from EPA (2020c), while the emission factors from coal-fired electricity generation are calculated 
to add up to total PM10 and VOC emissions from electric fuel combustion in 2018 (182 and 38 
kton) (EPA 2020a). 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the estimated percentage decrease of daily local pollution emissions. It 
shows that NOx and VOC have the largest decrease. The decrease of SOx is limited because 
coal-fired electricity generation is not much impacted. 
 
Figure 4: Estimated percentage decrease of daily local pollution emissions (error bars show 99% 
confidence intervals). 
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Table 3: Assumed emission factors of considered energy sources. 
 
Energy source Emission factor Source 
Gasoline [kg/barrel] 
CO2 369 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020a) 
SOx 0.018 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
NOx 1.145 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
PM10 0.083 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
VOC 0.621 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
Kerosene [kg/barrel] 
CO2 402 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020a) 
SOx 0.018 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
NOx 1.145 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
PM10 0.083 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
VOC 0.621 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
Gas-fired electricity generation [kg/MWh] 
CO2 480 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020e) 
SOx 0.012 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020e) 
NOx 0.118 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020e) 
PM10 0.026 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020c) 
VOC 0.019 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020c) 
Coal-fired electricity generation [kg/MWh] 
CO2 1090 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020e) 
SOx 0.983 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020e) 
NOx 0.724 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020e) 
PM10 0.115 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
VOC 0.008 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020a) 
Residential, commercial (heating) and industrial natural gas [kg/MMcf] 
CO2 53,120 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020a) 
SOx 0.27 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020c) 
NOx 23 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020c) 
PM10 3.5 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020c) 
VOC 2.5 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020c) 
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In a next step, we calculate the number of avoided deaths because of lower local pollution 
emissions. Using the mortality factors of table 3 (Muller 2014; Muller et al. 2011), Figure 5 presents 
the number of avoided deaths per month for the duration of the current shutdown measures. Our 
approach for U.S. total consumption and emissions implicitly assumes that emissions decrease 
uniformly across the U.S. This is a conservative estimate, given that the decrease of jet fuel and 
motor gasoline is larger in densely populated areas. To study the geographical distribution of local 
pollution in more detail, the next section looks at the concentration of PM2.5 across different monitors 
in the United States. 
 
Table 4: Deaths per 1000 tons of 
pollutant emissions in the U.S. 
(Muller 2014; Muller et al. 2011). 
Pollutant Deaths per 1000 tons 
SOx 2.7486 
NOx 0.2912 
PM10 7.9521 
VOC 0.6924 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Avoided deaths per month because of the estimated decrease emissions of 
local pollutants (error bars show 99% confidence intervals). 
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3 Decreased PM2.5 concentrations 
 
To study the concentration of local pollution more directly, compared to the aggregate emission 
in the previous section, we analyze PM2.5 concentrations using 2012-2020 data from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2020d) of 785 U.S. monitors with readings in April 2020. We 
use these 1.8 million day-monitor observations of mean PM2.5 concentrations to estimate the 
effect of shutdowns on local PM2.5 concentrations. As before, we run both a global polynomial 
and a two-step local regression, with the following empirical specification: 
                                           stage 1: P M 2.5i,t = δt + δi + hddt + cddt + εi,t                                                                                     (5)  
stage 2: ∆P Mˆ2.5i,t  = βCOV IDCOV IDi(s),t + timei + εi,t                                                           (6)   
Where δt are day-by-month fixed effects to control for regular patterns in PM2.5 concentrations, 
while δi are monitor fixed effects to control for persistent differences in PM2.5 concentrations. 
Because temperature affects air pollution, we also control for the number of heating or cooling 
degree days. In the second stage, βCOV ID is estimated as the difference of first-stage residuals 
in a narrow bandwidth around the discontinuity, indicated by the COVIDi,t dummy, which is 
equal to one when a stay-at-home order is effective in the state where monitor i is located (New 
York Times 2020). 
 
With a monitor-specific linear trend in the second stage, we find that PM2.5 concentrations 
have on average decreased by around -0.5 µ g/m3 since the start of the shutdowns. This result 
is robust to the inclusion of different monitor and time fixed effects (like week-of-year, day-of-
week month, and day). However, when the monitor-specific linear trend is removed from the 
estimation, the sign reverses and PM2.5 concentrations have increased since the start of the 
shutdowns. Therefore, we conclude that there is insufficient robust evidence (yet) that PM2.5 
concentrations have significantly decreased across the U.S. 
 
Figure 6 provides additional evidence of no significant changes in PM2.5 concentration by 
plotting the actual unweighted average PM2.5 concentration across all considered U.S. 
monitors in 2019-2020. It shows that PM2.5 concentrations have been within the interval of 
expected concentrations. 
 
 
Figure 6: Actual and predicted unweighted average PM2.5 concentrations across all 
considered U.S. monitors in 2019-2020 
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2020d) has data on concentrations of other local 
pollutants like SO2 and NO2, but at the time of writing this article, March and April 2020 data 
were not yet available. However, news articles have cited proprietary sources to suggest up to 
31% decline of NO2 in some urban areas, such as San Francisco (Wall Street Journal 2020). 
 
4 Reductions in Vehicle Crashes 
 
4.1 Data Sources 
 
Along with reduced driving should come reductions in vehicle crashes. We drew upon detailed 
crash records from several states that have publicly available data. 
 
The latest detailed crash records were available at the state/city level for Utah, Massachusetts, 
Iowa, California and New York city. This data is comprised of vehicle/person level crash entries 
and includes any collision that resulted in an injury, death or property value exceeding 
$1000/$1500 depending on the reporting authority.  
 
NYC data: 
Extracted from NYC Open Data portal: 
https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/Motor-Vehicle-Collisions-Vehicles/bm4k-52h4 
Series: Motor Vehicles Collisions – Vehicles 
Data provided by: Police Department (NYPD) 
Description: The Motor Vehicle Collisions vehicle table contains details on each vehicle involved 
in the crash. Each row represents a motor vehicle involved in a crash. It includes all crashes 
where there was an injury, a death or at least $1000 worth of property damage. 
Received/requested on: 04/01/2020 
Timespan we use: 01/01/2019-03/28/2020 
 
Utah: 
Requested from the Department of Public Safety, State of Utah 
https://highwaysafety.utah.gov/crash-data/ 
Timespan we use: 
Description: The data contains details on each crash and people involved. Information is collected 
when a crash involves injuries, deaths or at least $1,500 worth of property damage. 
Received/requested on: 04/01/2020 
Timespan we use: 01/01/2019-03/30/2020 
 
Massachusetts: 
Extracted from: MassDOT IMPACT Open Data 
https://massdot-impact-crashes-vhb.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/2020-person-level-crash-
details  
https://massdot-impact-crashes-vhb.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/2019-person-level-crash-
details- 
Provided by: Massachusetts Deparment of Transportation 
Description: The data contains details on each crash and people involved. Information is collected 
when a crash involves injuries, deaths or at least $1,000 worth of property damage. 
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Received/requested on: 04/23/2020 
Timespan we use: 01/01/2019-04/17/2020 
Iowa: 
Extracted from: ICAT – Iowa Crash Analysis Tool 
https://icat.iowadot.gov/ 
Provided by: Iowa Department of Transportation 
Records crashes that have resulted in an injury/fatality or the estimated property damage of the 
crash is equal to or greater than $1,500. 
Received/requested on: 04/22/2020 
Timespan we use: 01/01/2019-04/03/2020 
 
California: 
Extracted from: 
http://iswitrs.chp.ca.gov/Reports/jsp/userLogin.jsp 
Series comes from: The Statewide Integrated Traffic Records System (SWITRS) 
Provided by: California Highway patrol 
Records crashes that have resulted in an injury/fatality or the estimated property damage of the 
crash is equal to or greater than $1,000. 
Received/requested on: 04/10/2020 
Timespan we use: 01/01/2019-04/09/2020 
 
4.2 Analysis 
 
For initial descriptive evidence, we began by plotting the ratio of total traffic crashes in 2020 to 
the same time period in 2019 at the daily level. This is below in Figure 7. We observe a slight 
downward trend after February 26th, which is the date thought at the time to be the first Covid-19 
death in the United States and a clearer downward trend after March 13th when President Trump 
declared a national emergency. The average pre-February 26th ratio is just below 1, while the 
average post-March 13th ratio is 0.41 when averaged across all of these regions. 
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Figure 7: Seven-day moving average of the ratio of 2020 to 2019 crashes by state or region. 
Numbers greater than 1 indicate more crashes in 2020, while less than 1 indicate fewer 
crashes in 2020. The dotted line refers to February 26, while the shaded area includes all 
days after March 13th. 
 
We can create a similar figure for crash fatalities. Figure 8 shows this figure, which plots the ratio 
of crash fatalities in 2020 to 2019. The pattern is much less clear for fatalities and it is difficult to 
discern a downward trend. Looking at the data, the average fatality ratio drops only very slightly 
between pre-February 26th and post-March 13th. This might be due to higher speeds on roadways 
with less congestion leading to more fatal crashes when crashes do occur. 
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Figure 8: Seven-day moving average of the ratio of 2020 to 2019 fatal crashes by state or 
region. Numbers greater than 1 indicate more crashes in 2020, while less than 1 indicate 
fewer crashes in 2020. The dotted line refers to February 26, while the shaded area includes 
all days after March 13th. 
 
 
 
We also run a set of regressions to explore the effects further using difference-in-difference or 
regression discontinuity designs, and find similar results – a clear effect on overall traffic crashes, 
but little or no effect on fatalities, depending on the specification (results are available from the 
authors upon request). 
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5 Long-run Impacts 
 
We develop two illustrative thought experiments to provide insight into the potential long-run 
impacts of Covid-19. Our philosophy in this exercise is not to exactly forecast any outcome or 
provide probabilities on what the outcomes might be, but rather to provide a deeper understanding 
of the implications of possible scenarios of what might happen. We focus on only two scenarios 
for greater simplicity and transparency.  
 
Our first (optimistic) thought experiment is simple: Covid-19 is brought under control quickly with 
treatments and/or a vaccine, and a strong economic recovery quickly comes about. This 
economic recovery could happen as early as the fall of 2020. This scenario does not require much 
modeling, as it is clear that the impacts on long run technology development will be minimal, and 
while there may be budgetary impacts on firms and governments, these are not so arduous as to 
dramatically change the flows of capital towards clean technology. 
 
Our second thought experiment is much less optimistic. It represents a case where Covid-19 is 
not brought under control for at least another year, and perhaps longer. The global economy goes 
into a deeper recession. Government budgets at all levels are strained. Many firms go bankrupt 
and most of those that do not are just focusing on survival, and thus are short on cash to invest 
in new technologies. This thought experiment might be thought of as a plausible lower-bound on 
what might happen, although we would like to emphasize that even worse outcomes are still 
possible. We view this scenario as useful for allowing us to make some illustrative quantitative 
estimates of what the possible implications might be, recognizing that the exact numbers are not 
predictions, but rather projections of a possible world intended for insight into the factors at play. 
 
Note that we do not explicitly model policy interventions in either scenario, but rather assume that 
policy roughly follows the pre-Covid-19 trends. Explicitly modeling the policy responses and how 
they affect energy use and emissions is outside the scope of this commentary, but is a valuable 
pathway for future research. 
 
Our modeling of the second long-run scenario consists of two main components. First, energy 
demand will change due to the shutdown and economic recovery in the near future. Second, fuel 
mixes and emissions rates will change due to possible delays in renewable technology 
investments and product releases, which has longer-run implications. We combine our 
assumptions on energy demand and emissions rates to construct potential long-run impacts on 
emissions. Our calculations of emissions impacts are relative to the projections in the 2020 Annual 
Energy Outlook (AEO) Reference Case (EIA 2020e). We recognize that there are likely to be 
other impacts but we view these as the largest two impacts, and thus we focus on them for our 
illustrative estimates. One of the more notable other possible impacts could be an accelerating of 
coal plant retirements, leading to a counteracting emissions decrease. This could be due to 
permanently lower consumption due to the pandemic. At the end of Section 5.3, we will discuss 
how large the emission-reducing forces would have to be to compensate for the emissions 
increases we model. 
 
5.1 Short-run Change in Energy Demand: Electricity generation and light-duty vehicle 
miles traveled 
 
For impacts of the shutdown, we use our estimates on electricity generation, which found that 
electricity declined less than 10% due to the shutdown (Section 1 of the SI). Our scenario 
considers a strict shutdown lasting one to two quarters. We use historical data during and after 
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the 2008 Great Recession to help guide our construction of electricity generation scenarios during 
the post-shutdown economic recovery. Electricity generation dropped in 2009 and grew in 2010 
by about 4% each (Figure 6a, EIA 2020f). In the current pandemic, the slowdown in production 
and other economic activity hit much sooner than in the Great Recession that began with a 
financial crisis, so we assign the largest decline in electricity generation to 2020, followed by a 
similarly-sized rebound. We assume that electricity generation returns to the original trends by 
2023. Figure 9b depicts the Reference case from the 2020 AEO (EIA 2020e) in the solid line, one-
quarter shutdown in the dashed line, and a two-quarter shutdown in the dash-dotted line. 
 
 
 
 
(a) Historical U.S. electricity generation in terawatt hours, all sectors. Data source: EIA 
2020f. 
 
 
(b) Electricity generation projection used in calculations. 
Figure 9 
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For transportation, we focus on emissions from light-duty vehicles. Given that data on vehicle 
miles traveled (VMT) are not yet available from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), we 
turn to cellphone data provided by Apple Mobility Trends and Streetlight Data Inc. (See 
References for access information). Our scenarios consider a strict shutdown lasting one to two 
quarters. 
 
We again look to historical data on the Great Recession to guide our assumptions on what may 
happen to energy demand in transportation after the shutdown has been lifted and the economic 
recovery begins. Historical data on VMT in the U.S. (Figure 10a, FHWA 2020 and EIA 2020f) 
show that after about a 2% decline in 2008, VMT fluctuated with small increases and decreases 
during the recovery years afterwards.  
 
 
(a) Historical U.S. vehicle miles traveled in billions of vehicle miles. Data from the FHWA are 
for all traffic, while data from the EIA are for light-duty vehicles only (FHWA 2020, EIA 
2014). Both data series show about a 2% drop in VMT in 2008. 
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(b) Light-duty VMT projection used in our calculations. 
Figure 10 
 
Driving behavior change may persist after shutdowns are lifted. People may drive less if they work 
from home a few more days per week than before. However, people may drive more if they are 
concerned about contagion on public transit or other shared forms of transit. To take into account 
these two opposing effects on VMT, we assign 1/3 of the person-miles from public/shared transit 
to light-duty vehicle VMT through the end of 2022. Using data from the 2017 National Household 
Travel Survey (NHTS) and a summary report based on the NHTS, 1/3 of person-miles from public 
transit aligns with about 1% of light-duty VMT (FHWA 2017a, b). We assume work habits and 
public/shared transit ridership return to their original trend lines eventually, after vaccines become 
available and due to pressures from traffic congestion or financial constraints. Note that even 
though public/shared transit ridership is very low compared to light-duty VMT from a national 
perspective, such ridership tends to be concentrated in densely populated urban areas. 
Therefore, local policymakers in urban areas that already experience traffic congestion may be 
especially concerned about a shift from public/shared transit to private vehicles.  
In Figure 10b, the solid gray line depicts the reference case from the 2020 AEO (EIA 2020e). The 
dashed line represents VMT in an economic recession similar to the Great Recession of 2008. 
The two lines with big dips in 2020 represent VMT from one or two quarters of shutdown as well 
as VMT from behavioral changes. The VMT for all scenarios returns to the 2020 AEO reference 
case (EIA 2020e) from 2023 onwards. 
5.2 Long-run changes in investment and regulation 
To understand how there may be persistent, lingering effects of Covid-19, we are interested in 
comparing the shorter-run impacts to the long-run impacts of delayed investments in renewable 
technology and reducing vehicle emissions. 
Construction of new solar and wind generation capacity has halted or significantly slowed during 
1,900
2,100
2,300
2,500
2,700
2,900
3,100
3,300
3,500
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
Scenarios of VMT from Light-Duty Vehicles (Billion Vehicle Miles)
AEO 2020 Reference Case Recession only
1-Quarter Shutdown 2-Quarter Shutdown
 18 
 
the shutdown, depending on physical-distancing guidelines in each city or state. However, even 
after the shutdowns are lifted in the U.S., global supply chains may be slower to recover (EIA 
2020g). State and local government budgets for renewable technology projects may no longer be 
available. Improvements to the technology from innovation, R&D, and learning-by-doing may also 
be impacted in the long run. Therefore, we consider two potential scenarios in the long run. The 
first is to push back new renewable generation capacity in the 2020 AEO (EIA 2020e) reference 
case to a later year. The second is to push back new renewable generation capacity as well as 
to put renewables on a higher-cost path. Fortunately, there is a high-cost path in a 2020 AEO 
(EIA 2020e) side case that we leverage (Figure 11a). Our final emissions estimates will average 
across these cases. 
The future of improvements in vehicle technology also looks uncertain. Multiple car 
manufacturers, such as Ford, GMC, and Rivian, have announced delays in releasing new electric 
models without specifying a new date (Howard 2020, Foldy 2020). Many state and local 
government plans to invest in electric vehicle charging infrastructure are in limbo as budgets have 
been decimated. Lastly, people may drive more as well as buy less fuel-efficient vehicles due to 
historically low gas prices. At this time, it is unclear whether Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
standards (CAFE) will be relaxed (either in terms of whether the recently finalized 2020-2026 
Trump Administration SAFE rule will hold up in court or whether the standards will be adjusted 
further in later years due to the pandemic). Similarly, it is unclear whether the Zero-Emissions 
Vehicle (ZEV) mandates will be adjusted. Given this uncertainty, we consider an illustrative 
scenario where investment is pushed back and regulation is not as forceful, so that the overall 
fuel economy trajectory of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet is pushed back by five years (Figure 
11b). 
 
(a) Grey solid line represents the amount of electricity generated from renewable sources in 
the U.S. in the AEO 2020 reference case. The grey dashed line represents the scenario 
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where renewables take a high-cost path, which dampens investments. The yellow solid 
and long-dashed lines are our scenarios for renewable generation, pushed back by five 
years and either resuming the AEO reference case or taking the high-cost path, 
respectively. 
 
(b) The grey solid line is the reference case from the 2020 AEO. The yellow dashed line is 
our scenario for what might happen to fleet-wide fuel economy in the U.S. Fleet-wide fuel 
economy includes fuel economy of the vehicle stock, newly purchased vehicles, as well 
as EPA MPG-equivalents for alternative fuel vehicles. 
Figure 11 
 
5.3 Results: Comparing changes in short-run consumption to long-run investment and 
regulation  
Annual emissions from electricity and light-duty vehicles in our scenarios have similar patterns 
(Figure 2 in the main text and replicated below as Figure 12 for easy reference). Emissions during 
a one- and two-quarter shutdown are lower than the 2020 AEO reference case (EIA 2020e) and 
the percentage decrease of light-duty vehicle emissions during the early years of the Great 
Recession (gray dashed line in panel b). However, after quantities return to the original trend, 
annual emissions are higher because of delays in renewable technology investment or fuel 
economy improvements. The results in this section use the same emissions factors and mortality 
factors as in Section 1 and 2 of the SM. 
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Figure 12 Emissions Scenarios 
 
As we can see in Figure 12, emissions in the medium run from electricity in our scenarios are 
higher than the projections from the 2020 AEO reference case. Delays in the building of renewable 
generation capacity that was expected to come online from 2020 through 2023 outweigh the 
short-run reduction in electricity demand from the pandemic shutdown and an economic 
recession. Our calculations show that a delay by one year of anticipated renewable generation 
capacity investment (83 more deaths, 35 MMT CO2 more) would outweigh the emissions 
reductions from a one-quarter shutdown (56 fewer deaths, 24 MMT less CO2), for a net impact of 
27 more deaths from local pollution and 11 MMT more CO2 emitted. 
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In the next few years, emissions from light-duty vehicles decrease relative to the 2020 AEO 
reference case (EIA 2020e) because of the dramatic reductions in VMT during the shutdowns 
and declines during an economic recession. However, in the long run, emissions are higher 
relative to the reference case because of delays in fuel economy improvements and alternative 
fuel vehicle adoption in the scenario that we consider. 
For each year of each scenario, we take the new quantities of energy demanded (Figures 9b and 
10b) and calculate emissions based on the new fuel mix or fuel economy in our hypothetical long-
run scenarios (Figure 11) and the emissions factors in Table 3. We can then report the CO2 
emissions and translate the local pollutants to mortality impacts using the mortality factors in Table 
4. We find that emissions from electricity generation and light-duty vehicles would increase over 
the period 2020-2035 compared to the reference case. Carbon dioxide emissions would increase 
by about 2600 MMT, and total deaths due to local pollution would increase by about 7400. 
Table 5: Emissions outcomes from calculations based on scenarios of energy demand and 
investment described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.  
Electricity 
Difference Relative to 2020 AEO Reference Case 2020-2035 2020-2023 2024-2035 
NOx (ktons) 878 153 725 
SO2 (ktons) 938 164 774 
PM10 (ktons) 153 27 126 
VOC (ktons) 40 7 33 
Total Deaths 4075 712 3362 
Monthly Average Deaths 21.2 3.7 17.5 
CO2 Emissions (MMT) 1841 319 1522 
Light-Duty Vehicles 
Difference Relative to 2020 AEO Reference Case 2020-2035 2020-2023 2024-2035 
NOx (ktons) 2552 -654 3206 
SO2 (ktons) 40 -10 50 
PM10 (ktons) 186 -46 232 
VOC (ktons) 1384 -355 1739 
Total Deaths 3383 -841 4125 
Monthly Average Deaths 17.1 -17.5 28.6 
CO2 Emissions (MMT) 823 -211 1034 
 
The emissions outcomes for the different pollutants are included in Table 4 and in Table 5, we 
break out the change in carbon dioxide emissions and deaths from the reference case into those 
from consumption (short-run) and investment (long-run). To offset the additional CO2 emissions 
from delayed investments in electricity generation and light-duty vehicles, energy-related 
emissions would have to permanently decrease by at least 4%.  
In the electricity sector, we would need to enter 2024 with twice as much coal capacity retired 
than in the 2020 AEO reference case (which already includes continued coal plant retirements) 
to offset the delay in renewables investment in our scenario. We view this as somewhat unlikely, 
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although we would not be surprised if there is some increase in retirements. For further context, 
the additional CO2 emissions from delayed renewables investments over 2024-35 are equivalent 
to replacing about 41 GW of coal generation with gas-fired plants over the same period (at the 
average capacity factor of 62.6% projected by the 2020 AEO reference case (EIA 2020e) over 
2024-35). This is substantially greater than the coal plant retirements scheduled for 2020 pre-
Covid, which amount to 5.8 GW according to the U.S. Energy Information Adminstration 
(https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42495).  
Table 6: Carbon dioxide emissions and mortality impacts broken out by consumption change 
only, investment change only (renewable generation capacity or fuel economy improvements), 
and combined net effect. Because of division by fuel economy, the combined scenario for light-
duty vehicles is not a linear sum of the consumption-change-only and investment-change-only 
columns. All numbers are relative to the reference case. 
  Carbon emissions (CO2 MMT)   Deaths 
 consumption investment combined  consumption investment combined 
Electricity 
2020-35 -66 1907 1841  -154 4229 4075 
2020-23 -66 385 319  -154 867 712 
2024-35 0 1521 1521  0 3362 3362 
Light-Duty Vehicles 
2020-35 -439 1275 823  -1749 5087 3283 
2020-23 -439 241 -211  -1749 962 -841 
2024-35 0 1034 1034   0 4125 4125 
 
In future work, investigating the potential impact of policy responses, like stimulus investments, 
will be important.   
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